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6. Ian T. Ramsey
Abstract

In view of the requirement of verifiability that is demanded by certain philosophical schools, there seems little
justification for what are conventionally recognized as theological statements. Certainly no one man has yet
succeeded, except perhaps to his own satisfaction, in expressing religious notions in such language and in
verifying by such a method that universal consent is gained for the validity of his system. If the charm of
empirical verification is not invoked, then for some minds there is little reason to say anything. Obviously,
given such rigid requirements for securing a sympathetic audience, theological discussion may find itself
standing tongue-tied in the wings while logic and empiricism dominate the stage. But faced with the
possibility of the eventual demise of theology, an effort is made to translate religious experience into
intellectual terms which are acceptable to these critics. [excerpt]
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goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”
Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.
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6.

Ian T. Ramsey

In view of the requirement of verifiability that is de
manded by certain philosophical schools, there seems little
justification for what are conventionally recognized as theo
logical statements. Certainly no one man has yet succeeded,
except perhaps to his own satisfaction, in expressing religious
notions in such language and in verifying by such a method that
universal consent is gained for the validity of his system. If
the charm of empirical verification is not invoked, then for
some minds there is little reason to say anything. Obviously,
given such rigid requirements for securing a sympathetic audi
ence, theological discussion may find itself standing tonguetied in the wings while logic and empiricism dominate the stage.
But faced with the possibility of the eventual demise of the
ology, an effort is made to translate religious experience into
intellectual terms ,which are acceptable to these critics.
One defense of religion has reasserted the utility of spe
cific religious traditions in the preservation of civilization.
The defense claims that religion is the inner spiritual side of
a culture. Hence to oppose the basic religious conventions is
* Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1951) I, 100-105. Used with permission.
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to place one's mind and person against civilization. Thus re
ligion and its theological superstructure have been rescued
from criticism, not by a defense of their intrinsic value or
truth, but by relating them to what is more desirable: that
marvelous nest for man, civilization. This argument can of
course evoke a modicum of assent. But 1;he assent must be feeble
because religion and theology implicitly play second and third
fiddle; they are in effect tolerated for reasons extraneous to
their claim to be the expression of a response to reality be
yond the mind.
Perhaps the embarrassment to which theological discussion
is now subjected may be mitigated if it is defended not ob
liquely but directly. What this direct engagement with criti
cism of theology has attempted to do has been to give legit
imate status to the subjective quality of religious experience
and its theological statements. A good case in point is to be
found in Religious Language (1957), a recent book by Ian T.
Ramsey (1915- ^
J", which represents the school of logical
analysis. Ramsey is Professor of the Philosophy of the Chris
tian Religion in the University of Oxford.
The search for theological meaning in this book is pre
ceded by an attempt to establish validity for the language of
religious discussion. Ramsey claims that traditional utter
ances are obscure to those who do not first of all realize that
such language does not have objective, empirical data as its
reference. Rather, religious and theological language is a
response to a special situation (discernment-commitment) and
hence must be read or heard by those with an analytical bent as
"appropriately odd," if it is to be at all intelligible. This
means that certain words such as "God" or "person" when used in
a religious context will have special meaning beyond their sig
nificance on the normal level of language.
Ramsey is arguing, that language is only the medium by
which reason expresses itself, and at best it is an imperfect
medium. Something is lost between the thought and the word.
But certain conventional terms may really be used in two ways
or on two levels: the scientific and the metaphysical. For
example, "life" may refer to the general physical condition of
a body or it ma^ be used in a more elusive sense of a vitality
shared with the universe. This distinction implies the truthvalue of intuition. Hence experiential verification of knowl
edge and meaning is at least as reasonable as the experimental
verification. A mortician may conduct certain specific tests
to determine whether or not a person is a^ive after a severe
injury. But a poet may claim that the jungle is alive because
he has heard, felt, and seen the forest and its population from
within. The first "alive" requires experimental verification;
the second, experiential. The language that accompanies the
knowledge that is gained experientially will have to be used in
a special sense, because the language that expresses such knowl
edge seemingly has been tamed to do duty only for rigidly empir
ical knowledge. But such limited use of language is manifestly
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absurd. Under such strictures Ramsey argues that any attempt
at religious communication would be futile and deceptive. For
man lives in the world, not simply on it; all knowledge contains
an element of participation. That is, man as subject is re
lated to the world as object in such a way that he will always
mean more than he says when he speaks about what he knows.
By way of summary it can be said that language is the pri
mary mediiun for the expression of ideas. But ideas themselves
are not direct apprehensions of objects. Even ideas are ab
stract and symbolic constructions that are built from some pri
mary situation of relatedness. For theological discussion this
relatedness is to be equated with faith. And faith struggles
with language that is ill-suited as a vehicle for its fullness,
intensity, and elusiveness. Hence the school of theology under
discussion here seeks to establish the limits of language used
in theological exposition in order to be at all certain in what
is said about "meaning."
All of this is to suggest that any analysis of language
requires a prior analysis of how man knows anything. Actually,
then, the problem of meaning is more obviously stated than
solved by such analysis.
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